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Abstract
Due to the usual incompleteness of information representation, any approach to assign a semantics
to logic programs has to rely on a default assumption on the missing information. The stable model
semantics, that has become the dominating approach to give semantics to logic programs, relies on
the Closed World Assumption (CWA), which asserts that by default the truth of an atom is false.
There is a second well-known assumption, called OpenWorld Assumption (OWA), which asserts that
the truth of the atoms is supposed to be unknown by default. However, the CWA, the OWA and the
combination of them are extremal, though important, assumptions over a large variety of possible
assumptions on the truth of the atoms, whenever the truth is taken from an arbitrary truth space.
The topic of this paper is to allow any assignment (i.e. interpretation), over a truth space, to be
a default assumption. Our main result is that our extension is conservative in the sense that under
the “everywhere false” default assumption (CWA) the usual stable model semantics is captured. Due
to the generality and the purely algebraic nature of our approach, it abstracts from the particular
formalism of choice and the results may be applied in other contexts as well.
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1. Introduction
The incompleteness of information representation is a well-known phenomena in knowl-
edge representation and reasoning. As a consequence, one usually relies on some default
assumption on the missing information, to complete the intended meaning of the repre-
sented information. For instance, in logic programming, the stable model semantics [20],
which is likely the most widely studied and most commonly accepted approach to give
meaning to logic programs, relies on the Closed World Assumption (CWA) [46] to com-
plete the available knowledge. The CWA assumes that all atoms not entailed by a program
are false, and is motivated by the fact that explicit representation of negative information
in logic programs, and in knowledge representation languages in general, is not feasible
because the addition of explicit negative information could overwhelm a system. Another
well-known assumption is the so-calledOpenWorld Assumption (OWA), which asserts that
the default truth value of every atom is supposed to be unknown. For instance, the OWA is
used for many biological databases that explicitely contain incomplete knowledge. More-
over in such a context, as some microorganisms have been completely sequenced, while
many others have not, onewould like to have the ability to specify theOWAor the CWAover
particular “regions” of the database. However, the CWA, the OWA and the combination of
them 1 , which ﬁnd their application in Extended Logic Programming (see e.g. [2]), are
extremal, though important, assumptions over a large variety of possible assumptions on
the truth of the atoms, whenever the truth is taken from an arbitrary truth space.
The main topic of this study is a generalization of the use of assumptions in logic pro-
gramming. That is, rather than to rely on the same default truth value for all atoms (‘false’
under CWA, ‘unknown’ under OWA) we allow any interpretation over a given truth space
to be a default assumption, to be used to complete the meaning of a logic program. For
instance, while integrating information coming from different sources, some sources may
be considered as less reliable than others. In such a case, a distinction could be made be-
tween “supposed” and “sure” knowledge. Indeed the knowledge provided by less reliable
sources should be considered as supposed knowledge to be used to complete, but without
introducing contradictions, the knowledge provided by the other sources that should be
considered as sure. So, e.g. an insurance company may rely on a priori computed statistics
and/or on information provided by another insurance company to complete its own available
information about a new client in order to compute the risk coefﬁcient (for more examples,
see Section 4).
In summary, our main results in this paper are that (i) our extension is conservative in the
sense that under the “everywhere false” default assumption (CWA) the usual stable model
semantics is captured; and (ii) due to the generality and the purely algebraic nature of our
approach, it abstracts from the particular formalism of choice and the results may be applied
in other, non-logic programming, contexts as well.
Our presentation is structured as follows. In the next section, we brieﬂy recall some
preliminary notions. In Section 3, we deﬁne epistemic and ﬁxed-point characterizations
of the semantics that can be associated with any logic program with respect to any given
1 With “combination of OWA and CWA” we mean that some atoms truth is by default unknown, while for the
others the truth is by default false.
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world assumption. We also show that our approach captures the usual semantics of logic
programs, and that, as a consequence, our approach provides new characterizations of the
stable models semantics. In Section 4 we provide some examples of uses of the newly
deﬁned semantics, while Section 5 concludes, mentions related work and gives an outlook
for further research. Proofs are given in the Appendix.
2. Preliminaries
The truth spaces we consider are the so-called bilattices [23], which are a much richer
structure than the classical {f, t} space.
Due to their interesting mathematical structure, bilattices play an important role in (es-
pecially in theoretical aspects of) logic programming, and in knowledge representation in
general, allowing to develop unifying semantical frameworks.Notably, our setting conforms
to Fitting’s general logic programming framework [15,16,18].
Informally, a bilattice is a non-empty, possibly inﬁnite set of truth-values provided with
two ‘orthogonal’ partial orders, each one giving to the set of truth values the structure of a
lattice.
In the sequel we deﬁne the main notions related to lattices, bilattices, logic programs and
describe the usual semantics associated to logic programs.
2.1. Lattices and bilattices
A lattice is denoted as 〈L,〉, where  is a partial order over the non-empty set L. We
write x ≺ y if xy and x = y. The notions of least upper bound (also, join) of x, y ∈ L,
and that of greatest lower bound (also,meet) of x and y are as usual. We assume that lattices
are complete, i.e. every subset of L has both a least upper and a greatest lower bound. With
⊥ and we denote the least element and the greatest element of a lattice, respectively. For
ease, given S ⊆ L, with-least and-greatest element w.r.t. Swe alwaysmean the greatest
lower and the least upper bound, respectively. With min(S) we denote the set of minimal
elements in S, i.e. {x ∈ S:y ∈ S s.t. y ≺ x}. If {x} = min(S) (if there is an unique
minimal element), for convenience wemay also write x = min(S). A function (also called
operator) from L to L is monotone, iff for all x, y ∈ L, xy implies f (x)f (y), while
f is antitone if xy implies f (y)f (x). A ﬁxed-point of f is an element x ∈ L such that
f (x) = x.
Thebasic tool for studyingﬁxed-points of operators on lattices is thewell-knownKnaster–
Tarski theorem [49],which establishes that amonotoneoperatorf :L→ Lhas aﬁxed-point,
the set of ﬁxed-points of f is a complete lattice and, thus, f has a -least and a -greatest
ﬁxed-point. The-least (respectively,-greatest) ﬁxed-point can be obtained by iterating
f over ⊥ (respectively, ).
A bilattice is a structure 〈B,t ,k〉 where B is a non-empty set and t and k are
both partial orderings giving B the structure of a complete lattice with a top and bottom
element (see, e.g. [23]).Meet and join undert , denoted∧ and∨, correspond to extensions
of classical conjunction and disjunction. On the other hand, meet and join under k are
denoted ⊗ and ⊕. x ⊗ y corresponds to the maximal information x and y can agree on,
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Fig. 1. Bilattices: (a) FOUR, (b) {f,⊥,t}  {f,⊥,t} and (c) K([0, 1]).
while x ⊕ y simply combines the information represented by x with that represented by y.
Top and bottom under t are denoted t and f, and top and bottom under k are denoted
 and ⊥, respectively.
The simplest non-trivial bilattice, called FOUR (see Fig. 1), is due to Belnap [6], who
introduced a logic intended to dealwith incomplete and/or inconsistent information.FOUR
already illustrates many of the basic properties concerning bilattices. Essentially, FOUR
extends the classical truth set {f, t} to {f, t,⊥,}, where⊥ stands unknown, and stands
for inconsistent.
The two orders are the so-called knowledge ordering k and the truth ordering t .
If xk y then y represents ‘more information’ than x. On the other hand, if xt y then
y represents ‘more truth’ than x. For instance, in FOUR, ⊥k fk , ⊥k tk ,
ft ⊥t t and ft t t.
Furthermore, we assume that bilattices are inﬁnitary distributive bilattices in which all
distributive laws connecting∧,∨,⊗ and⊕hold.Wealso assume that every bilattice satisﬁes
the inﬁnitary interlacing conditions, i.e. each of the lattice operations ∧,∨,⊗ and ⊕ is
monotone w.r.t. both orderings (e.g. xt y and x′t y′ implies x ⊗ x′t y ⊗ y′). Finally,
we assume that each bilattice has a negation, i.e. an operator¬ that reverses thet ordering,
leaves unchanged the k ordering, and veriﬁes 2 ¬¬x = x.
Bilattices come up in natural ways. Indeed, there are two general, but different, construc-
tion methods, which allow to build a bilattice from a lattice and are widely used. We just
sketch them here in order to give a feeling of their application (see also [15,23]).
The ﬁrst bilattice construction method comes from [23]. Suppose we have two complete
distributive lattices 〈L1,1〉 and 〈L2,2〉. Think of L1 as a lattice of values we use when
we measure the degree of belief of a statement, while think of L2 as the lattice we use when
we measure the degree of doubt of it. Now, we deﬁne the structure L1L2 as follows. The
structure is 〈L1 × L2,t ,k〉, where
• 〈x1, x2〉t 〈y1, y2〉 if x11 y1 and y22 x2,
• 〈x1, x2〉k 〈y1, y2〉 if x11 y1 and x22 y2.
2 The dual operation to negation is conﬂation i.e. an operator∼ that reverses thek ordering, leaves unchanged
the t ordering, and ∼∼ x = x. We do not deal with conﬂation in this paper.
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InL1L2 the idea is: knowledge goes up if both degree of belief and degree of doubt go up;
truth goes up if the degree of belief goes up, while the degree of doubt goes down. It is easily
veriﬁed that L1  L2 is a bilattice. Furthermore, if L1 = L2 = L, i.e. we are measuring
belief and doubt in the same way, then negation can be deﬁned as ¬〈x, y〉 = 〈y, x〉. That
is, negation switches the roles of belief and doubt. In Fig. 1 we report the bilattice based on
L1 = L2 = {f,⊥, t} and order 1 = 2 = , where f⊥ t.
The second construction method has been sketched in [23] and addressed in more details
in [19], and is probably themore used one. Supposewe have a complete distributive lattice of
truth values 〈L,〉 (like e.g. inMany-valued Logics [24]). Think of these values as the ‘real’
values we are interested in, but due to lack of knowledge we are able just to ‘approximate’
the exact values. That is, rather than considering a pair 〈x, y〉 ∈ L×L as indicator for degree
of belief and doubt, 〈x, y〉 is interpreted as the set of elements z ∈ L such that x z y.
Therefore, a pair 〈x, y〉 is interpreted as an interval. An interval 〈x, y〉 may be seen as an
approximation of an exact value. For instance, in reasoning under uncertainty (see, e.g.
[34–36]), L is the unit interval [0, 1] with standard ordering, L×L is interpreted as the set
of (closed) sub-intervals of [0, 1], and the pair 〈x, y〉 is interpreted as a lower and an upper
bound of the exact value of the certainty value. Formally, given a distributive lattice 〈L,〉,
the bilattice of intervals, denoted K(L), is 〈L× L,t ,k〉, where:
• 〈x1, x2〉t 〈y1, y2〉 if x1 y1 and x2 y2,
• 〈x1, x2〉k 〈y1, y2〉 if x1 y1 and y2 x2.
The intuition of those orders is that truth increases if the interval contains greater values,
whereas the knowledge increases when the interval becomes more precise. Negation can
be deﬁned as ¬〈x, y〉 = 〈¬y,¬x〉, where ¬ is a negation operator on L. As an example, in
Fig. 1 we report the bilattice K([0, 1]).
In practice bilattices has been used in several ways. For instance, Arieli and Avron
show [4,5] that the use of four values is preferable to the use of two or three values even for
tasks that can in principle be handled using only three values. The algebraicwork of Fitting’s
ﬁxed-point characterisation of stable model semantics on bilattices has been the root of the
work carried out by Denecker et al. [11–13], who extended Fitting’s work to a more abstract
context of ﬁxed-points operators on lattices, by relying on interval bilattices. Denecker et
al. showed [11,13] interesting connections between (two-valued and four-valued) Kripke–
Kleene [17], well-founded and stable model semantics, as well as to Moore’s autoepistemic
logic [43] and Reiter’s default logic [47]. Other well-established applications of bilattices
and/or Kripke–Kleene, well-founded and stable models semantics to give semantics to logic
programs can be found in the context of reasoning under paraconsistency and uncertainty
(see, e.g. [1,3,7,9,10,33–36]). In particular, “belief-doubt” bilattices are used in paracon-
sistent logic programming [1,9] and anti-tonic logic programming [10], while “interval”
bilattices are used in work like [11–13,34–36].
2.2. Logic programs
We follow the deﬁnitions of Fitting [15,16]. Consider an alphabet of predicate symbols,
of constants, of function symbols and variable symbols. A term, t, is inductively deﬁned as
usual: t is either a variable x, a constant c or of the form f (t1, . . . , tn), where f is an n-ary
function symbol and all ti are terms. An atom, A, is of the form p(t1, . . . , tn), where p is
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an n-ary predicate symbol and all ti are terms. A literal, l, is of the form A or ¬A, where
A is an atom. A formula, , is an expression built up from the literals and the members
of a bilattice B using the logical operators ∧,∨,⊗,⊕, ∃ and ∀. Note that members of the
bilattice may appear in a formula, e.g. inFOUR, (p∧q)⊕(r⊗f) is a formula. A rule is of
the form p(x1, . . . , xn) ← (x1, . . . , xn), where p is an n-ary predicate symbol and all xi
are variables. The atom p(x1, . . . , xn) is called the head, and the formula (x1, . . . , xn) is
called the body. Note that the body may be any formula. It is assumed that the free variables
of the body are among x1, . . . , xn. Free variables are thought of as universally quantiﬁed.
A logic program, denoted with P , is a ﬁnite set of rules. Note that, e.g. rules with terms in
the head, like
p(s(x)) ← p(x),
p(0) ← t
may be rewritten in our context as
p(y) ← ∃ x(eq(y, s(x)) ∧ p(x)),
p(y) ← eq(y, 0),
where eq is a predicate deﬁning equality.
The Herbrand universe of P is the set of ground (variable-free) terms that can be built
from the constants and function symbols occurring in P , while the Herbrand base of P
(denoted BP ) is the set of ground atoms over the Herbrand universe.
Given a logic program P , with P∗ we denote the ground instantiation of P obtained
as follows: let us denote with ground(P) all ground instances of members of P (over the
Herbrand Universe), then
(1) put in P∗ all ground instances of members of P (over the Herbrand Universe), i.e.
include ground(P) in P∗,
(2) replace several ground rules in P∗ having same head, A ← 1, A ← 2, . . . with
A ← 1 ∨ 2 ∨ . . . . Note that as there could be inﬁnitely many grounded rules with
same head, we may end with a countable disjunction, but the semantics behavior is
unproblematic; and
(3) additionally, if a ground atom A is not head of any rule in P∗, then the rule A ← f is
added to P∗. Note that it is a standard practice in logic programming to consider such
atoms as false. We incorporate this by explicitly adding A ← f to P∗. This already
acts as a kind of default assumption on non-derivable facts. We will change this point
once we allow any default value as assumption later one.
Therefore, in P∗ all atoms of the Herbrand base appear in the head of exactly one rule. For
instance, for the program P above, for any ground term t, P∗ contains a unique rule with
the atom p(t) in head:
p(t)← (∃x(eq(t, s(x)) ∧ p(x))) ∨ eq(t, 0).
We next specify the usual semantics of logic programs over bilattices. Indeed, we deﬁne
the notions of model, Kripke–Kleene model, well-founded model and stable model of P .
For ease, we will rely on the following simple running example to illustrate the concepts
we introduce in the paper.
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Table 1
Models, Kripke–Kleene, well-founded and stable models of P
Ii P Ii KK(P) WF(P) Stable sIfP (Ii ) UP (Ii ) H-founded H-closed
p q models p q models models
I1 ⊥ ⊥ • • • ⊥ ⊥ ∅ • •
I2 t ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ∅ •
I3   • f f {p, q} • •
I4 t  f f {p, q}
Example 1 (running example). Consider the following logic programP with the following
rules.
p ← p ∨ q,
q ← ¬q.
In Table 1 we report the models Ii , the Kripke–Kleene, the well-founded and the stable
models of P , marked by bullets. The columns on the right-hand side will be discussed
later on.
Let 〈B,t ,k〉 be a bilattice. By interpretation of a logic program on the bilattice we
mean a mapping I from ground atoms to members of B. An interpretation I is extended
from atoms to formulae in the usual way: (i) for b ∈ B, I (b) = b; (ii) for formulae  and
′, I ( ∧ ′) = I () ∧ I (′), and similarly for ∨,⊗,⊕ and ¬; and (iii) I (∃x(x)) =∨{I ((t)): t ground term}, and similarly for universal quantiﬁcation. 3 The family of all
interpretations is denoted by I(B). The truth and knowledge orderings are extended from B
to I(B) point-wise as follows: (i) I1t I2 iff I1(A)t I2(A), for every ground atom A; and
(ii) I1k I2 iff I1(A)k I2(A), for every ground atom A. Given two interpretations I, J ,
we deﬁne (I ∧ J )() = I () ∧ J (), and similarly for the other operations. With If and
It we denote the bottom and top interpretations undert (they map any atom into f and t,
respectively). With I⊥ and I we denote the bottom and top interpretations underk (they
map any atom into ⊥ and , respectively). It is easy to see that the space of interpretations
〈I(B),t ,k〉 is an inﬁnitary interlaced and distributive bilattice as well.
An interpretation I is amodel of a logic programP (see [15,16]), denoted by I P , iff for
all A←  ∈ P∗, I (A) = I () holds. The above deﬁnition of model follows the so-called
Clark-completion procedure [8], where we replace in P∗ each occurrence of ← with ↔.
Indeed, usually a model has to satisfy I ()t I (A) only, i.e. A ←  ∈ P∗ speciﬁes the
necessary condition on A, “A is at least as true as ”. Under the Clark-completion, the
constraint becomes also sufﬁcient, i.e. the unique rule involving A in P∗ completely deﬁnes
A. Note that the condition I (A) = I () may also be seen as the result of a typical truth
minimization process, i.e. given the unique rule A ←  ∈ P∗, in logic programming one
usually tries to minimize the truth of A. More formally, let P and I be a logic program and
3 As we will see below, the bilattice is complete w.r.t. t , so existential and universal quantiﬁcation are well-
deﬁned.
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an interpretation, respectively. Then
I P iff I = min
t
{J : I ()t J (A), for all A←  ∈ P∗}. (1)
In a classical logic program the body is a conjunction of literals. Therefore, if A ←  ∈
P∗ (except for the case A ← f ∈ P∗), then  = 1 ∨ . . . ∨ n and i = Li1 ∧ . . . ∧
Lin . Furthermore, a classical total interpretation is an interpretation over FOUR such
that an atom is mapped into either f or t. A partial classical interpretation is a classical
interpretation where the truth of some atom may be left unspeciﬁed. This is the same as
saying that the interpretation maps all atoms into either f, t or ⊥.
For a set of literals X, with ¬.X we indicate the set {¬L:L ∈ X}, where for any atom A,
¬¬A is replaced with A. Then, a classical interpretation (total or partial) can also be repre-
sented as a consistent set of literals, i.e. I ⊆ BP ∪¬.BP and for all atoms A, {A, ¬A} I .
Of course, the opposite is also true, i.e. a consistent set of literals can straightforwardly be
turned into an interpretation over FOUR.
Given an interpretation I, we introduce the notion of program knowledge completion, or
simply, k-completion with I, denoted P ⊕ I . The program k-completion of P with I, is the
program obtained by replacing all rules A ←  ∈ P∗ by A ←  ⊕ I (A). For instance,
given P and I2 in Example 1, P ⊕ I2 is {p ← (p ∨ q)⊕ t, q ← (¬q)⊕⊥}. Essentially,
the idea is to enforce any model J of P ⊕ I to be such that for a given rule A ←  ∈ P∗,
J (A) carries as much knowledge as determined by P and I, i.e. J ()⊕ I (A). Note that the
notion of k-completion has no analogue in classical logic programming as⊕ is not allowed
as a construct. k-completions will play an important role in our formalization.
2.3. Usual semantics of logic programs
Usually the semantics of a program P is determined by selecting a particular interpreta-
tion, or a set of interpretations, ofP in the set of models ofP . We consider three semantics,
which are likely the most popular and widely studied semantics for logic programs, namely
the Kripke–Kleene semantics, the well-founded semantics and the stable model semantics,
in increasing order of knowledge [15–17,20,21,50].
2.3.1. Kripke–Kleene semantics
The Kripke–Kleene semantics [15,17] has a simple and intuitive characterization, as it
corresponds to the least model of a logic program under the knowledge order k , i.e. the
Kripke–Kleene model of a logic program P is KK(P) = mink {I : I P}. Note that, in the
light of Eq. (1), the Kripke–Kleene semantics is a composition of a truth-minimization and
then of a knowledge minimization. The existence and uniqueness of KK(P) is guaranteed
by the ﬁxed-point characterization below, bymeans of the immediate consequence operator
P . For an interpretation I, for any ground atom A
P (I )(A) = I (),
where 4 A←  ∈ P∗.
4 Recall that all ground atoms are head of exactly one rule in P∗.
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It can be shown that (see [15]) (i) in the space of interpretations, the operator P is
monotone under k , (ii) the set of ﬁxed-points of P is a complete lattice under k and,
thus, P has a k-least (and k-greatest) ﬁxed-point; and (iii) I is a model of a program
P iff I is a ﬁxed-point ofP . Therefore, the Kripke–Kleene model of P coincides with the
least ﬁxed-point ofP underk , which can be computed in the usual way by iteratingP
over I⊥.
In this paper, we will use the following property, which can easily be shown. Let P be a
logic program and let J and I be interpretations. Then
P⊕I (J ) = P (J )⊕ I. (2)
In particular, J P ⊕ I iff J = P (J )⊕ I holds.
2.3.2. Stable model semantics
The stablemodel semantics approach, has been deﬁned ﬁrst byGelfond andLifschitz [20]
with respect to the classical two valued truth space {f, t} and extended by Fitting to bi-
lattices [15,16]. Informally, an interpretation I is a stable model of a logic program P if
I = I ′, where I ′ is computed according to the so-called Gelfond–Lifschitz transformation:
(1) substitute (ﬁx) in P∗ the negative literals by their evaluation with respect to I. Let PI
be the resulting positive program, called reduct of P w.r.t. I; and
(2) compute the truth-minimal model I ′ of PI .
For instance, given P and I1 in Example 1, PI1 is {p ← p ∨ q, q ← ⊥}, whose t -least
model is I1. Therefore, I1 is a stable model. On the other hand, PI2 = PI1 , whoset -least
model is I1, so I2 is not a stable model.
Note that the main principle of this transformation is based on the separation of the
role of positive and negative information. As a consequence, this separation avoids the
natural management of classical negation (i.e. the evaluation of a negative literal ¬A is
given by the negation of the evaluation ofA), which is a major feature of the Kripke–Kleene
semantics [17,18] of logic programs with negation.
Formally, Fitting [15,16] relies on a binary immediate consequence operatorP , which
accepts two input interpretations over a bilattice, the ﬁrst one is used to assign meanings
to positive literals, while the second one is used to assign meanings to negative literals.
Let I and J be two interpretations in the bilattice 〈I(B),t ,k〉. The notion of pseudo-
interpretation I$J over the bilattice is deﬁned as follows (I gives meaning to positive
literals, while J gives meaning to negative literals): for a pure ground atom A:
(I$J )(A) = I (A),
(I$J )(¬A) = ¬J (A).
Pseudo-interpretations are extended to non-literals in the obvious way. 5 For instance,
(I$J )(¬A ∧ B) = (I$J )(¬A) ∧ (I$J )(B) = ¬J (A) ∧ I (B). We can now deﬁne
P as follows. For I, J ∈ I(B),P (I, J ) is the interpretation, which for any ground atom
A is such that
P (I, J )(A) = (I$J )(),
5 Note that negation may appear in front of a literal only.
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where A ←  ∈ P∗. Note that P is a special case of P , as by construction P (I ) =
P (I, I ).
It can be shown that (see [15]) in the space of interpretations the operatorP is monotone
in both arguments underk , and under the orderingt it is monotone in its ﬁrst argument
and antitone in its second argument.
To deﬁne the stable model semantics, Fitting [15] introduces the ′P operator, whose
ﬁxed-points will be the stable models of a program. For any interpretation I, ′P (I ) is the
t -least ﬁxed-point of the operator x.P (x, I ), i.e.
′P (I ) = lfpt (x.P (x, I )).
Due to the t -monotonicity, ′P is well deﬁned. Additionally, (i) the operator ′P is
monotone in the k ordering, and antitone in the t ordering; and (ii) every ﬁxed-point
of ′P is also a ﬁxed-point of P , i.e. a model of P . Finally, a stable model for a logic
program P is a ﬁxed-point of′P .
The set of ﬁxed-points of ′P , i.e. the set of stable models of P , is a complete lattice
under k and, thus, ′P has a k-least (and k-greatest) ﬁxed-point, which is denoted
WF(P).WF(P) is known as the well-founded model ofP and, by deﬁnition coincides with
the k-least stable model, i.e. WF(P) = mink ({I : I stable model of P}).
Concerning the truth order, in [37] it is shown that stable models are incomparable with
each other with respect to t , i.e. given two stable models I and J such that I = J , then
I t J and J t I .
Finally,′P (I ) can be computed by iterating x.P (x, I ) starting from the everywhere
false interpretation If, while the k-least stable model (i.e. well-founded model) and the
k-greatest stable model can be computed by iterating ′P starting from I⊥ and I,
respectively.
It is interesting to note, and we will largely refer to it in this paper, that for classical
logic programs there is also an alternative equivalent deﬁnition of WF(P) based on the
well-known notion of unfounded set (see, e.g. [30,50]). The underlying principle of the
notion of unfounded sets is to identify the set of atoms that can safely be assumed false if
the current information about a logic program is given by an interpretation I. Indeed, given
a partial classical interpretation I and a classical logic program P , a set of ground atoms
X ⊆ BP is an unfounded set (i.e., the atoms in X can be assumed as false) for P w.r.t. I iff
for each atomA ∈ X, ifA←  ∈ P∗, where  = 1∨ . . .∨n and i = Li1 ∧ . . .∧Lin ,
then i is false either w.r.t. I or w.r.t. ¬.X, for all 1 in.
A well-known property of unfounded sets is that the union of two unfounded sets of P
w.r.t. I is an unfounded set as well and that there is a unique greatest unfounded set for P
w.r.t. I, denoted by UP (I ). See Table 1 for the greatest unfounded sets w.r.t. the models of
the logic program in Example 1.
Now, consider the usual immediate consequence operator TP , where for any ground
atom A,
TP (I )(A) = t iff there isA←  ∈ P∗ s.t. I () = t,
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and consider the well-founded operator [50] over partial classical interpretations I,
deﬁned as
WP (I ) = TP (I ) ∪ ¬.UP (I ). (3)
WP (I ) can be rewritten asWP (I ) = TP (I )⊕¬.UP (I ), by deﬁning⊕ = ∪,⊗ = ∩ in the
lattice 〈2BP∪¬.BP ,⊆〉 (the partial order ⊆ corresponds to the knowledge order k). Then,
the well-founded semantics is deﬁned to be the k-least ﬁxed-point of WP in [50], and
it is shown in [30] that the set of total stable models of P coincides with the set of total
ﬁxed-points of WP . In particular, this formulation reveals that the greatest unfounded set,
¬.UP (I ), is the additional “false default knowledge”, which is brought into by the CWA
to the usual semantics of logic programs based on TP . However,WP does not characterize
partial stable models. Indeed, there are partial interpretations being ﬁxed-points ofWP (I ),
but are not stable models.
As we will see in the next section, the notion of unfounded set and theWP operator are
more suitable to be extended to the casewhere any interpretation is considered as the default,
rather than relying on the Gelfond–Lifschitz transform and, thus, on the′P operator, which
are ‘hard-wired’ on the everywhere false assumption.
This concludes the preliminary part.
3. The AWA in logic programming
In the following, a hypothesis (denotedH) is always an interpretation over a bilattice and
represents our default assumption over the world. The principle underlying the Any-World
Assumption (AWA) H is to regard H as an additional source of default information to be
used to complete the implicit knowledge provided by a logic program. The AWAH dictates
that any atom A, whose truth-value cannot be inferred from the facts and rules, is assigned
to the default truth value H(A). For comparison, under the CWA every atom has default
truth value false, so H = If is assumed, while under the OWA, by default we have no
information (knowledge) about the atoms truth, and, thus we may assume that the default
truth value of an atom is ⊥ (no knowledge), i.e. H = I⊥ is assumed.
We have seen in the previous section that any ground atom A not appearing in the head of
any rule and, thus, not derivable, is mapped into ‘false’ compliant with the CWA.We added
A ← f to P∗. Now, according to the AWA, any such atom A is mapped into H(A) and,
thus, we should add A ← H(A) to P∗ rather than A ← f. If not speciﬁed otherwise, in
the following we will always assume that given a hypothesis H, a program P and a ground
atom A not appearing in the head of the ground instantiation of P , we change Point 3 of the
deﬁnition of P∗ and always add A ← H(A) to P∗. It should be noted that this implicitly
affects also all deﬁnitions based onP∗, e.g. the deﬁnitions of model, Kripke–Kleene model,
k-completion and that of P (which now maps such atoms into H(A) rather than into f).
Now, we proceed in three steps:
(1) In the next section, we introduce the notion of support, denoted sHP (I ), provided by a
hypothesis H to a program P w.r.t. an interpretation I. The support is a generalization
of the notion of unfounded sets (which determines the atoms that can be assumed to be
false) w.r.t. I. Indeed, sHP (I ) determines the amount of default information, provided by
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the AWA H, that can safely be joined to I to complete it. It turns out that for classical
logic programs under the everywhere false hypothesis H = If, the support coincides
with the negation of the greatest unfounded set 6 , i.e. sHP (I ) = ¬.UP (I ). Roughly
speaking, we may say that the “unfounded atoms” are the only atoms whose truth value
can be modiﬁed by their default value.
(2) Any model I ofP k-subsuming its support, i.e. sHP (I )k I , tells us that the additional
source for default information cannot contribute further to improve our knowledge about
the program. We call such models H-founded models of P , which will be discussed in
Section 3.2. H-founded models can be characterized as ﬁxed-points of the operator
˜P (I ) = P (I )⊕ sHP (I ),
which is very similar to theWP operator inEq. (3), but generalized to logic programming
over bilattices w.r.t. any hypothesis H. H-founded models have an interesting property
when H = If. Indeed, as expected, in this case it can be shown that the k-least
H-founded model is the well-founded model of P .
(3) Unfortunately, while for classical logical programs and total interpretations, ˜P (I )
(under H = If) characterizes total stable models (in fact, ˜P = WP ), this charac-
terization is not true in the general case of interpretations over bilattices. Therefore,
in Section 3.3, we further reﬁne the class of H-founded models, by introducing the
class of H-closed models. This class requires H-founded models to satisfy some mini-
mality condition with respect to the knowledge order k . Indeed, a H-closed model I
has to be deductively closed according to the Kripke–Kleene semantics of the program
k-completed with its support, i.e.
I = KK(P ⊕ sHP (I )).
Therefore, we can identify the support as the added-value (in terms of knowledge),
which is brought into by a default hypothesiswith respect to the standardKripke–Kleene
semantics of P . H-closed models have the desired property that, under the everywhere
false hypothesis H = If, the set of stable models (over bilattices) coincides with the
set of H-closed models.
Example 2 (running example cont.). Consider Example 1. In Table 1 we also report the
support, H-founded models and H-closed models. Note that stable models and H-closed
models coincide. Similarly, the support and the negation of the greatest unfounded set
coincide as well. We also consider the AWA H = It (see Table 2). Note that now under
H = It, contrary to the case H = If, I2 and I4 are H-closed models of which I2 is both
the Kripke–Kleene and the well-founded model w.r.t.H. Essentially, the difference is in the
truth of p, which in the former case is always t, while in the latter case is⊥ (I1) and (I3),
respectively.
6 Recall that ¬.UP (I ) is a set of negative literals and can be viewed as a 3-valued interpretation, assigning f
to elements of UP (I ) and ⊥ to all others.
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Table 2
Models, H-founded models and H-closed models of P w.r.t. H = It
Ii  P Ii sHP (Ii ) KK(P ⊕ sHP (Ii )) H-founded models H-closed models
p q p q p q
I1 ⊥ ⊥ t ⊥ t ⊥
I2 t ⊥ t ⊥ t ⊥ • •
I3   t t t  •
I4 t  t t t  • •
3.1. Support
The main notion we introduce here is that of support provided by a hypothesis H to
a logic program P w.r.t. an interpretation I. If I represents what we already know about
an intended model of P , the support represents the k-greatest amount of information
provided by a hypothesis H, which can be joined to I in order to complete I. The main
principle underlying the support can be explained as follows. Consider a ground atom A
and its related rule A ←  ∈ P∗, an interpretation I, which is our current knowledge
about P , and an AWA H. We would like to determine how much default knowledge can be
‘safely’ taken from H to complete I. So, let us assume that J k H amounts to the default
knowledge taken from H. J (A) is the default information provided by J to the atom A.
The completion of I with J is the interpretation I ⊕ J . In order to accept this completion,
we have to ensure that the assumed knowledge J (A) is entailed by P w.r.t. the completed
interpretation I ⊕ J , i.e. for A←  ∈ P∗, J (A)k (I ⊕ J )() = P (I ⊕ J )(A) should
hold. This notion is given by the following deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 3 (safe interpretation). LetP , I andH be a logic program, an interpretation and
a hypothesis, respectively. An interpretation J is safe w.r.t. P , I and H iff:
(1) J k H ,
(2) J k P (I ⊕ J ).
Note that in the above deﬁnition, the ﬁrst item dictates that any safe interpretation is a
carrier of information, which is taken from the hypothesis H. As it is not realistic to expect
that the whole hypothesisH can be considered as “consistent” with the program, only some
parts of it will be taken (J k H ). For instance, in Example 1, w.r.t.H = It and I1, we can
safely assume by default that the truth of p is t (i.e., J (p) = tk P (I ⊕ J )(p) = t),
while the truth of q taken from the assumption H should be ⊥ (J (q) = ⊥) and not t, as
J (q) = t is not consistent with the program, i.e. J (q) = t k P (I ⊕ J )(q) = f.
Safe interpretations have an interesting reading once we restrict our attention to the
classical framework of logic programming: the concept of safe hypothesis reduces to that
of unfounded set.
Theorem 4. Let P and I be a classical logic program and a partial classical interpretation,
respectively. Consider the CWAH = If. Let X be a subset 7 ofBP . Then X is an unfounded
set of P w.r.t. I iff ¬.Xk P (I ⊕¬.X), i.e. ¬.X is safe w.r.t. P , I and H.
7 Note that this condition can be rewritten as ¬.X ⊆ P (I ∪ ¬.X).
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Like for unfounded sets, among all possible safe interpretations w.r.t. P , I and H, we are
interested in themaximal one underk , which is unique. Thek-greatest safe interpretation
will be called the support provided by H to P w.r.t. I.
Deﬁnition 5 (support). Let P , I and H be a logic program, an interpretation and a hypoth-
esis, respectively. The support provided by H to P w.r.t. I, or simply support of P w.r.t.
I,H , denoted sHP (I ), is the k-greatest safe interpretation J w.r.t. P , I and H.
It is easy to show that the support is a well-deﬁned concept. Consider X = {J : J is safe
w.r.t. P , I and H }. As the bilattice is a complete lattice under k , lubk (X) =
⊕
J∈X J .
Let us show that J¯ = lubk (X) is safe w.r.t. P , I and H. Now, consider J ∈ X. Therefore
J k J¯ . But, J is safe, so J k H and J k P (I⊕J )k P (I⊕ J¯ ) (byk-monotonicity
ofP ). As a consequence, bothH andP (I ⊕ J¯ ) are upper bounds of X. But J¯ is the least
upper bound of X and, thus, J¯ k H and J¯ k P (I ⊕ J¯ ) follows. That is, J¯ is safe and
the k-greatest safe interpretation w.r.t. P , I and H, and, thus, by deﬁnition sHP (I ) = J¯ =
lubk (X).
Note that it follows directly from the deﬁnition of safe interpretation that under the OWA
H = I⊥, sHP (I ) = I⊥ holds for any interpretation I, i.e. no additional default knowledge
can be inferred from the assumption, as expected.
Example 6. Let us consider the interval bilattice, obtained from the real unit interval [0, 1],
representing closed sub-intervals of [0, 1]. Consider the logic program P with rules
A← B,C
C ← C,D
B ← 〈0.7, 0.7〉
D ← 〈0.9, 0.9〉
If we try to infer as much knowledge as possible from that program without using any
default knowledge, i.e. by relying on the assumption H = I⊥, then we ﬁnd that the truth
of B and D are exactly 0.7 and 0.9 respectively, while the truth of A and C are at most
0.7 and 0.9 respectively, i.e. I (A) = 〈0, 0.7〉, I (B) = 〈0.7, 0.7〉, I (C) = 〈0, 0.9〉 and
I (D) = 〈0.9, 0.9〉. Relying now on a more informative assumptionH asserting that e.g. the
value of C is by default at least 0.6, i.e. H(C) = 〈0.6, 1〉, then we should come up with a
more precise characterization of A and C by “adding” that assumed knowledge to I : C is
in 〈0.6, 0.9〉, and consequently A is in 〈0.6, 0.7〉. Indeed, consider the following table, with
interpretations I, J1, J2, J¯ and assumption H.
A B C D
I 〈0, 0.7〉 〈0.7, 0.7〉 〈0, 0.9〉 〈0.9, 0.9〉
H 〈0.4, 0.5〉 〈0, 1〉 〈0.6, 1〉 〈0, 0〉
J1 〈0.3, 0.7〉 〈0, 1〉 〈0.6, 1〉 〈0, 0.9〉
J2 〈0.4, 0.8〉 〈0, 1〉 〈0.6, 1〉 〈0, 0.9〉
J¯ 〈0.4, 0.7〉 〈0, 1〉 〈0.6, 1〉 〈0, 0.9〉
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Then both J1 and J2 are safe w.r.t. P, I and H. It is easy to see that the k-greatest safe
interpretation, i.e. the support, is J¯ = J1⊕J2. Interestingly, note how J¯ provides to I some
additional information (i.e. better lower bounds) on the values of A and C, respectively.
Other examples of supports can be found in Tables 1 and 2.
It then follows immediately from Theorem 4 that in the classical setting the notion of
greatest unfounded set is captured by the notion of support, i.e. the support tells us which
atoms may safely be assumed as false, given a partial classical interpretation I, a classical
logic program P and the everywhere false assumption (see Table 1).
Corollary 7. LetP and I be a classical logic programand a partial classical interpretation,
respectively. Then sHP (I ) = ¬.UP (I ), for H = If.
Therefore, the support is an extension of the notion of unfounded sets (i) to logic pro-
gramming over bilattices; and (ii) to arbitrary default assumptions.
As next, we show how the support can effectively be computed as the iterated ﬁxed-point
of the function
I,HP (J ) = H ⊗ P (I ⊕ J ).
It is easy to verify that I,HP is monotone w.r.t. k , as only k-monotone operators are
involved.
Theorem 8. Let P , I and H be a logic program, an interpretation and a hypothesis, re-
spectively. Consider the iterated sequence of interpretations FI,Hi : for any i0,
F
I,H
0 = H,
F
I,H
i+1 = I,HP (F I,Hi ).
The sequenceFI,Hi is monotone decreasing underk and, thus, reaches a ﬁxed-pointFI,H ,
for a limit ordinal . Furthermore, sHP (I ) = FI,H holds.
Theorem 9. Let P be a logic program. The support operator sHP (I ) is monotone in its
arguments I and H w.r.t. k .
Theorem 9 has an intuitive reading: it states that the more knowledge we have about a
ground atom A, the more information can be provided by the AWA to A.
Interestingly, for a classical logic program P and a partial classical interpretation I, by
Corollary 7, the above method gives us a simple top-down method to compute the negation
of the greatest unfounded set, ¬.UP (I ), by means of the iteration
F0 = ¬.BP ,
Fi+1 = ¬.BP ∩ P (I ∪ Fi).
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3.2. H -founded models
Among all possible models of a program P , let us consider those models, which
k-subsume their own support, i.e. that could not be completed anymore by the
AWA.
Deﬁnition 10 (H-founded model). Let P and H be a logic program and a hypothesis
H, respectively. An interpretation I is a H -founded model of P iff I  P and
sHP (I )k I .
Example 11. Consider Example 6. It can be veriﬁed that the interpretation I¯ such that
I¯ (A) = 〈0.6, 0.7〉, I¯ (B) = 〈0.7, 0.7〉, I¯ (C) = 〈0.6, 0.9〉, and I¯ (C) = 〈0.9, 0.9〉 is a model
of P such that its support is J¯ and J¯kI¯ . Therefore, I¯ is a H-founded model of P .
If we consider the deﬁnition of the support in the classical setting, thenH-foundedmodels
are such that 8 ¬.UP (I ) ⊆ I , i.e. the false atoms provided by the unfounded set are already
false in the interpretation I. Therefore, the CWA does not further contribute to improve the
knowledge of I about the program P .
H-founded models have interesting properties, as stated below.
Theorem 12. Let P , I and H be a logic program, an interpretation and a hypothesis,
respectively. The following statements are equivalent:
(1) I is a H-founded model of P ,
(2) I = P (I )⊕ sHP (I ),
(3) I  P ⊕ sHP (I ),
(4) I = P (I ⊕ sHP (I )).
Note that, by deﬁnition, the Kripke–Kleene semantics of a program coincides with its
k-least model founded on the assumption that assigns the value f to the atoms that are in
the head of no rule. So, given a logic programP , withHKK let us denote the hypothesis that
assigns to the atoms that are in the head of no rule the value f, while assigns to the others
⊥. Therefore:
Corollary 13. Let P , I and H be a logic program, an interpretation and a hypothesis,
respectively. If H = HKK then I is the k-least H-founded model of P iff I is the Kripke–
Kleene model of P .
The above corollary follows from the fact that for H = HKK , sHP (I ) = H and, thus, by
Theorem 12, I  P ⊕H iff I is the Kripke–Kleene model of P .
From a ﬁxed-point characterization point of view, from Theorem 12 it follows immedi-
ately that the set of H-founded models can be identiﬁed by the ﬁxed-points of at least two
8 I is viewed as a set.
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k-monotone immediate consequence operators:
HP (I )=P (I ⊕ sHP (I )), (4)
˜
H
P (I )=P (I )⊕ sHP (I ). (5)
This also guarantees the existence and uniqueness of the k-least H-founded model of a
program P . Furthermore, these operators have a quite interesting property, once we restrict
our attention to the everywhere false hypothesis H = If. Under this condition, it can
be shown that the least ﬁxed-point under k of HP and, thus, of ˜
H
P coincides with the
well-founded semantics. Therefore,
Theorem 14. Consider a logic program P . Then thek-least H-founded model of P w.r.t.
the hypothesis H = If is the well-founded semantics of P .
Note that the above theorem is not surprising in the light of the fact that the ˜HP operator
is quite similar to the WP operator deﬁned in Eq. (3) for classical logic programs and
interpretations. The above theorem essentially extends the relationship to general logic
programs interpreted over bilattices.
Summing up, as the support is k-monotone in H, from I⊥k HKK k If we have the
expected result:
Corollary 15. Given a logic program P , thek-least H-founded model, IOWA, of P under
H = I⊥, the k-least H-founded model, IKK , of P under H = HKK (i.e. the Kripke–
Kleene model of P), the k-least H-founded model, IWF , of P under H = If (i.e. the
Well-Founded model of P), it follows that IOWAk IKK k IWF .
While for classical logical programs and total interpretations, ˜HP (I ) (under H = If)
characterizes stable total models (as, ˜HP = WP ), this is not true in the general case
of interpretations over bilattices. In fact, from Table 1, we see that the partial classical
interpretation I2 is a H-founded model not being stable.
3.3. H -closed models
The problem mentioned above comes from the fact that someH-founded models contain
knowledge that is neither entailed by the program nor by the safe part of the hypothesis.
For instance, underH = If, I2 is aH-founded model that asserts that the truth value of p is
t, knowledge that can neither be entailed by the program nor by H. Consequently, we shall
concentrate on thoseH-founded models that do not contain any extra knowledge other than
the knowledge provided by the hypothesis. In doing this, we group H-founded models into
sets of models having a given support and then take the least informative one from each
group. Formally, for a given interpretation I, we will consider the class of all models of
P ⊕ sHP (I ), i.e. interpretations which contain the knowledge entailed by P and the support
sHP (I ), and then take the k-least model of this class. If this k-least model is I itself then
I is a H-closed model.
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Deﬁnition 16 (H -closed model). Let P , I and H be a logic program, an interpretation and
a hypothesis, respectively. Then I is a H-closed model of P iff I = mink {J  P ⊕ sHP (I )},
i.e. the unique k-least model of the program P ⊕ sHP (I ) coincides with I. 9
Therefore, if I is aH-closedmodel then I  P⊕sHP (I ), i.e. I = P⊕sHP (I )(I ) = P (I )⊕
sHP (I ). Therefore, by Theorem 12, any H-closed model is a H-founded model as well, i.e.
I  P and sHP (I )k I .
Interestingly, H-closed models have also a different, equivalent and quite suggestive
characterization. In fact, it follows immediately from Deﬁnition 16 that mink {J : J  P ⊕
sHP (I )} = KK(P ⊕ sHP (I )). Therefore,
Theorem 17. Let P , I and H be a logic program, an interpretation and a hypothesis,
respectively. Then I is a H-closed model of P iff I = KK(P ⊕ sHP (I )).
That is, given an interpretation I, a logic programP and a hypothesisH, among all models
ofP , we are looking for thek-least models deductively closed under support k-completion
(models that can be entailed by the program using their own support without any other extra
knowledge). For instance, the interpretation I¯ in Example 11 is a (the k-least) H-closed
model as well.
Finally, we may note that by Theorem 17, the ﬁxed-points of the immediate consequence
operator KK(P ⊕ sHP (·)) are exactly the H-closed models and, thus, the sequence of inter-
pretations
I0 = I⊥,
Ii+1 = KK(P ⊕ sHP (Ii)),
converges to the k-least H-closed model, which, thus, always exists and is unique.
We can device also an alternative immediate consequence operator. In the following we
present the operator ˜HP , which coincides with KK(P ⊕ sHP (·)), i.e. ˜
H
P (I ) = KK(P ⊕
sHP (I )) for any interpretation I, but does not require any, even intuitive, program transforma-
tion like P ⊕ sHP (·). This may be important in the classical logic programming case where
P ⊕ sHP (·) is not easy to deﬁne (as ⊕ does not belong to the language of classical logic
programs). We show that the set of H-closed models coincides with the set of ﬁxed-points
of ˜HP .
Deﬁnition 18 (immediate consequence operator ˜HP ). Consider a logic program P , an in-
terpretation I and a hypothesis H. Then ˜HP (I ) is deﬁned as the following limit of the
9 Uniqueness is guaranteed by the fact that the set ofmodels J ofP⊕sHP (I ) coincides with the set of ﬁxed-points
of the k-monotone operator P⊕sHP (I )
(J ) = P (J )⊕ sHP (I ).
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sequence of interpretations J I,Hi : for any i0,
J
I,H
0 = sHP (I ),
J
I,H
i+1 = P (J I,Hi )⊕ J I,Hi .
It is easy to note that the sequence J I,Hi above is monotone increasing under k and,
thus has a limit.
The following theorem follows directly fromk-monotonicity ofP and of the support,
and from the Knaster–Tarski theorem.
Theorem 19. The operator ˜HP (I ) is monotone in its arguments I and H w.r.t. k .
The following theorem characterizes the set of H-closed models in terms of ﬁxed-points
of ˜HP .
Theorem 20. Let P , I and H be a logic program, an interpretation and a hypothesis,
respectively. Then ˜HP (I ) = KK(P ⊕ sHP (I )).
It then follows immediately that
Corollary 21. An interpretation I is a H-closed model of P iff I is a ﬁxed-point of ˜HP .
The following concluding theorem establishes that we have extended stable model se-
mantics from the CWA to the AWA. Indeed, stable models of a logic program P coincide
with ﬁxed-points of ˜HP , under the closed world assumption (everywhere false hypothesis)
H = If.
Theorem 22. Let P , I and H = If be a logic program, an interpretation and the
everywhere false hypothesis (CWA), respectively. The following statements are equivalent:
(1) I is a stable model of P ,
(2) I is a H-closed model of P ,
(3) I = ˜HP (I ),
(4) I = KK(P ⊕ sHP (I )).
Note that the above theorem gives new, both epistemic and ﬁxed-point, characterizations
of the stable models and emphasizes the role of the CWA. In particular, note the conceptual
shift from the truth-based characterization of stable models to the knowledge-based one,
i.e. from
I = lfpt (x.P (x, I ))
to
I = min
k
{J  P ⊕ sHP (I )}.
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Furthermore, unlike the Gelfond–Lifschitz transformation, it shows that no program trans-
formation nor separation of the roles of positive and negative information are necessary
in that semantics. In particular, the characterization of stable models through ˜HP , where
H = If, can be rewritten in the classical setting as follows. Consider a classical logic pro-
gram P , then a partial interpretation I is a stable model of P , if and only if it is deductively
closed under its greatest unfounded set completion, i.e. if and only if it coincides with the
limit of the sequence:
J
I,H
0 = ¬.UP (I ),
J
I,H
i+1 = P (J I,Hi ) ∪ J I,Hi .
Both Corollary 21 and Theorem 22 are illustrated in Tables 2 and 1, respectively.
4. Some applications of the AWA
Our approach allows deductive reasoning with default knowledge. That knowledge can
be deﬁned by or gathered in different ways. Of course, the programmer could deﬁne the
AWA that should be associated with its program, but other scenarios could be developed as
well. For instance, an assumption could be given by some knowledge, which would not be
completely reliable, such as knowledge provided by some external source. In this scenario
an assumption could be provided by the semantics of e.g. another logic program or by
rules, which do hold normally, but admit exceptions. We illustrate some applications of our
approach in the following examples.
4.1. Mixing OWA and CWA
Consider the following case, adapted from [32,36]. A judge is collecting information
from two sources, the public prosecutor and the counsel for the defense, in order to decide
whether to charge a person named Ted, accused of murder. The truth space isFOUR, as the
collection of information from different sources may easily lead to contradictory situations.
The judge ﬁrst collects a set of facts
F = { has_witness(Ted)← f
friends(John, Ted)← t}.
Then he combines them with his own set of rules R (described below) in order to make a
decision.
is_suspect(x) ← has_motive(x) ∨ has_witness(x)
is_cleared(x) ← ∃ y(has_alibi(x,y) ∧ ¬friend(x,y))
is_cleared(x) ← is_innocent(x) ∧ ¬is_suspect(x)
friend(x,y) ← friend(y,x)
friend(x,y) ← ∃ z(friend(x,z) ∧ friend(z,y))
charge(x) ← is_suspect(x)⊕¬is_cleared(x).
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The program isP = F ∪R. The last rule is the judge’s “decisionmaking rule” and describes
how the judge works: he joins the evidence of being suspect together with that of being
not cleared to decide whether to charge Ted. The question is: what should the value of
charge(Ted) be? Using F and R, then uniform default assumptions are not appropriate.
Indeed, if the judge relies on theCWA, then hewill decide thatTed is not cleared andmust be
charged despite the absence of proof. Relying on the OWA, the atoms is_suspect(Ted),
is_cleared(Ted) and charge(Ted) will be unknown, and the judge cannot take a
decision (approaches based on OWA are often too weak). Assuming that by default the
atoms has_motive(Ted), has_witness(Ted) and is_suspect(Ted) are false, that
the atom is_innocent(Ted) is true and that the others are unknown seems to be an
appropriate assumption here. Relying on this assumption, the judge will infer that Ted is
cleared, not suspect and should not be charged.
Related to the above example are those taken from the context of Extended Logic Pro-
grams (ELPs) (see, e.g. [2,3,21]). In ELP one can distinguish between explicit negation,
¬A, and default negation, not (A). Informally, in the former case, to infer ¬A we have
to provide an explicit proof of ¬A, while in the latter case, we infer not (A) if no proof
of A exists. ELP offers a way of expressing explicitly a closed world assumption on an
atom A by means of a rule of the form ¬A ← not(A). That is A is false if no proof of
A exists. In our approach, however, we do not rely, from a syntax point of view, on two
different constructs ¬A and not(A), but have ¬A only. The main difference to ELP is that
in our approach we do not give a special meaning to ¬A, but rather manage it naturally:
the evaluation of a negative literal ¬A is given by the negation of the evaluation of A. The
fact that A has a default value, H(A), can in some special cases give to ¬A a particular
behavior. For instance, we may state a closed world assumption on an atom A by means of
H(A) = f and, thus, ¬A may behave like not (A), while state an open world assumption
on an atom A, simulating explicit negation, by means of H(A) = ⊥. Also, by using the
method described in [21] (and used in [2] as well) to remove expressions of the form ¬A
in ELPs, we may “translated” an ELP into our framework. Informally, given an ELP P , we
ﬁrst replace all expressions ¬A with a new atom A¯ (in [21], A¯ is called the positive form of
¬A) and, second, we then replace all expressions not (A)with¬A and postulateH(A) = f
for these atoms. All the other atoms have default value ⊥ 10 . For instance, consider the
ELP (see [21]) P1 = {(¬P ← t), (P ← ¬Q)}. Then according to the semantics of [21],
P1 has unique answer set {¬P }. In our setting, assuming H = I⊥, P1 is evaluated over
FOUR and transformed into {(P¯ ← t), (P ← Q¯)}. Therefore, the k-least H-founded
model I is such that I (P¯ ) = t and I (Q) = ⊥, which is one-to-one related to the answer
set of P1.
However, in this paper we are not going to investigate further the relationship be-
tween ELPs (with their various semantics [2,3,21]) and our framework, but rather want
to show how to use the feature of the any world assumption in some of the application
10 We may also additionally relate A¯ to A with some axioms, as in [2]. For instance we may add {A¯ ← ¬A}
(this is called the strong negation axiom in [2]), or add {A← ¬A¯} (this is called the weak negation axiom or add
{(A← ¬A¯), (A¯← ¬A)} (this is called the classical negation axiom).
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scenarios considered for ELPs:
• Consider, for instance, a rule expressing the fact that “if someone is innocent (s)he cannot
be guilty”. This may be represented by
Guilty(x)← ¬Innocent(x).
We assume (which is the rule in most countries) that anyone is by default innocent and not
guilty i.e. H(Innocent(a)) = t, H(Guilty(a)) = f. Therefore, in order to charge
someone, we have to provide a “proof” for being guilty (i.e. not innocent) from the facts.
• Similarly, a rule expressing the fact that “a car may cross railway tracks if there is no
crossing train” may be represented by
Cross_railway_tracks← ¬Train_is_comming.
In this situation, in order to safely cross the railway there should be explicit evidence that
the train is not coming and, thus,wemay assumebydefault thatH(Train_is_comming)
= ⊥ (i.e. the atom is interpreted according to OWA) together with the defaultH(Cross_
railway_tracks) = f, for safety.
• The set of terminal vertices (see [21]) of a directed graph can be deﬁned by the following
logic program:
Terminal(x)← ¬Arc(x,y)
and hypothesis H(Arc(a,b)) = f, for all a,b of the Herbrand universe (the default for
all instances of Terminal is not relevant).
• Suppose we have the logic program (see [21])
Employed(jack,stanford)← t
Employed(jane,sri)← t
AdequateIncome(x)← Employed(x,y)
Then under the (OWA) hypothesis H = I⊥, in the H-founded model we have that
both AdequateIncome(jack) and AdequateIncome(jane) are evaluated to t. How-
ever, under the above hypothesis both Employed(jack,sri) and Employed(jane,
stanford) are evaluated to ⊥. If we further assume that the database is complete, then
we can formulate this hypothesis by using the CWA, i.e. H = If. In this latter case the
H-founded model evaluates both Employed(jack,sri) and Employed(jane,stan-
ford) to f, as expected. If, however, the available employment information is complete
for Stanford only then we have to consider the hypothesisH(Employed(a,stanford))
= f and H(Employed(a,sri)) = ⊥, for all individuals a of the Herbrand universe.
Then the H-founded model evaluates Employed(jack,sri) to ⊥, while evaluates
Employed(jane,stanford) to f, as expected.
4.2. Information integration with uncertainty
Consider the following case, adapted from [35]. Consider an insurance company, which
has information about its customers used to determine the risk coefﬁcient of each customer.
The company has a setP of rules to compute the risk coefﬁcient. In our case, the value of the
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risk coefﬁcient has to be re-evaluated as the client is a new client and his risk coefﬁcient is
given by his precedent insurance company. The bilattice we consider is the interval bilattice
over the real unit interval [0, 1], i.e. the elements of the bilattice represents sub-intervals of
[0, 1]. The client declares to be 28-years old, to be not that experienced, but fairly good driver
and driving more or less a sport car. The risk coefﬁcient of his precedent insurance company
is in between 0.6 and 0.8. The client’s declarations are considered as the hypothesis H:
H(Young(john)) = 〈0.7, 1〉
H(Experience(john)) = 〈0.1, 0.5〉
H(Good_driver(john)) = 〈0.6, 1〉
H(Sport_car(john)) = 〈0.6, 0.8〉
H(Risk(John)) = 〈0.6, 0.8〉.
The rules of the company are the following:
Good_driver(X) ← Experience(x) ∧ ¬Risk(x)
Risk(x) ← Young(x)
Risk(x) ← Sport_car(x)
Risk(x) ← Experience(x) ∧ ¬Good_driver(x).
The rules would be formulated more realistically, in case we couple our language with
a framework capable of combining uncertainty values in a more ﬂexible way, like for
instance [27,28], in which computable functions are allowed to combine certainty values.
In our case, these functions are restricted to be ∧,∨,⊗,⊕ and ¬. See, for instance, [36] as
a ﬁrst step in this direction.
Now, it can be veriﬁed that the k-least H-closed model is I, where
I (A) =


〈0.7, 1〉 if A = Young(john)
〈0.1, 0.5〉 if A = Experience(john)
〈0.3, 1〉 if A = Good_driver(john)
〈0.6, 0.8〉 if A = Sport_car(john)
〈0.7, 1〉 if A = Risk(john).
Note that both the risk coefﬁcient, Risk(john), as well as the driver capabilities, Good_
driver(john), of the client have been revised.
4.3. Default rules
Another frequent source of defaults is the case where we also want to express default
statements of the form
Normally, unless something abnormal holds, then  implies A.
Such statementswere themainmotivation for non-monotonic logics likeDefault Logic [47],
Autoepistemic Logic [14,39,42,44] and Circumscription [40,41] (see also [22]). We can
formulate such a statement in a natural way, using abnormality theories, as
A←  ∧ ¬Ab,
Ab ← ¬A , (6)
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where Ab stands for abnormality, and then consider the hypothesis H(Ab) = f, i.e. by de-
fault there are no abnormal objects. McCarty [40,41] originated the concept of abnormality
theory as a way to represent default reasoning in Circumscription. Defaults are represented
with an introduced abnormality predicate: for instance, to say that normally birds ﬂy, we
would use the rule
Flies(x)← Bird(x) ∧ ¬Ab1(x)
Ab1(x)← ¬Flies(x). (7)
Here the meaning of Ab1(x) is something like “x is abnormal with respect to ﬂying birds”.
Note that there can bemany different kinds of abnormality, and they are indexed according to
kind. Likewise in Circumscription, where abnormality predicates are minimized (allowing
relevant predicates to vary—e.g. Flies), we have to assert that no object is abnormal by
default, i.e. H(Ab1(t)) = f, for all terms t over the Herbrand universe.
Abnormality theories can represent two important types of defeating arguments. One
usually distinguishes between defeaters that contradict outright a default (Type I defeaters),
and those where only the justiﬁcation for a default is undermined, without contradicting
its conclusion (Type II defeaters). Here is some illustrating example. If it is known that
tweety is a bird, which does not ﬂy (Type I defeat) then we add to rule (7) the two facts
Bird(tweety) ← t
Flies(tweety) ← f.
Here the conclusion Ab1(tweety) follows in all H-closed models. On the other hand, we
infer that Flies(a) for any bird a such that a = tweety.
For Type II defeat, we simply assert that tweety is abnormal, without asserting that he
does not ﬂy, i.e. we add to rule (7) the fact
Ab1(tweety)← t.
Then the conclusion ¬Flies(tweety) follows in all H-closed models.
Note that, due to the generality of the notion of hypotheses, we may also deal with
“(default) degrees of abnormality”, rather than just consider the classical {f, t} setting.
So, for instance, we may take advantage of some statistical indication on the number of
abnormal birds w.r.t. the property of ﬂying: we may state that H(Ab1(t)) = 〈0, 0.2〉 in the
interval bilattice, indicating that the degree of being a bird t a non-ﬂyer is quite low. So, for
instance if we add to rule (7) the two facts
Bird(polly) ← 〈1, 1〉
Ab1(tweety) ← 〈0.9, 1〉,
dictating that polly is a bird and that tweety is likely abnormal w.r.t. ﬂying, then 11
the conclusions Flies(polly) and Flies(tweety) follow in all H-closed models with
degree 〈0.8, 1〉 and 〈0, 0.1〉, respectively. Therefore, polly “likely” ﬂies, whereas tweety
does “unlikely” ﬂy.
11H(Flies(t)) = H(Bird(t)) = 〈0, 1〉.
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Interestingly, default rules like (7) or variants may automatically be generated within
the context of Inductive Logic Programming (ILP) (see, e.g. [29,45,48]) and Data Mining
(DM) (see, e.g. [25]). In particular, if we are interested in the predicate Flies, informally
one of the tasks in ILP and in DM, more precisely in the task of mining association rules,
is to induce/mine a rule “explaining (to some degree)” the observations about the predicate
Flies. A candidate rule may then have the form of (7) and is usually accompanied by some
measures indicating an “appropriateness” degree of the rule. For instance, in mining associ-
ation rules [25] (ILP has different measures), these values are usually the support, roughly
indicating the probability of being Flies(x)∧Bird(x) true, and the conﬁdence, indicat-
ing the conditional probability P(Flies(x)|Bird(x)). Anyway, the important point here
is that both ILP as well as DM can be considered as two similar ways to generate default
rules and assumptions about abnormality predicates associated to those rules which may
then be coupled together to some sure knowledge in order to make some new inferences,
as we have seen above.
5. Conclusions and related work
In this paper we introduced the notion of Any-World Assumption (AWA). It generalizes
the well-known notions of OWA and CWA. The former dictates that the default truth of the
atoms is ‘unknown’, while the latter establishes that the default truth value is ‘false’. These
are two, though important, extreme assumptions of a large variety of possible assumptions.
The AWA is a generalization of the above concepts as any assignment over any truth value
set can be used as an assumption, i.e. as default knowledge. Our formalization assumes a
monotone operator over the space of interpretations over bilattices, whose ﬁxed-points are
assumed to be the intended models of the world being represented by a set of formulae
under the OWA. The particular instantiation we have chosen is that of logic programs, and
the monotone operator is P , whose ﬁxed-points are the so-called Kripke–Kleene models
of a program. We have then introduced the notion of support, which regards the AWA as an
additional source of information to be used to complete the knowledge provided by a logic
program. The way we couple the support to the implicit knowledge provided by a logic
program generalizes the well-known and long studied notion of stable model semantics
for logic programs, which is based on the CWA. In fact, if we restrict our attention to the
everywhere false assumption, then the usual stable models semantics is obtained and the
support is one-to-one related with the greatest unfounded set.
Our work generalizes related work such as [2,26,31,32,36]. In [31] it has been shown
that the usual semantics of logic programs can be obtained through a unique computation
method, but using different uniform assumptions, i.e. assumptions that assign the same
default truth-value to all the atoms. In [2,26] some atoms are allowed to be interpreted ac-
cording to the OWA, while others are allowed to be interpreted according to the CWA and,
thus, roughly the choice of the default is restricted to the value unknown and/or false (addi-
tionally, [26] allows to manage default rules as well). Closer to our approach are [32,36].
But, in [36], the extension is conﬁned to particular logic programs for the management of
certainty values and limited to the well-founded semantics [50] only and, thus, is just a
particular case of our framework. Finally some concepts presented here were ﬁrst sketched
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in [32] but relying on some particular mode of evaluation of formulas that weakens the
approach. As a consequence, the semantics proposed in [32] captured the well-founded
semantics for Datalog programs with negation in three-valued logics, but fails for general
logic programs over arbitrary truth spaces. Moreover no relationship to stable models was
established.
There are still several issues open. Amain objective is to extend the framework to the case
where any set of formulae, not just logic programs are considered. Towards this direction it
would be interesting, as ﬁrst step, to extend the AWA to disjunctive logic programs, where
rules are of the form L1∨ . . .∨Ln ← , and then generalize it to arbitrary formulae of the
form 1 ← 2.
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Appendix. Some proofs
Theorem 4. Let P and I be a classical logic program and a partial classical interpretation,
respectively. Consider the CWA H = If. Let X be a subset of BP . Then X is an unfounded
set 12 of P w.r.t. I iff ¬.XkP (I ⊕¬.X), i.e., ¬.X is safe w.r.t. P , I and H.
Proof. Suppose X is unfounded w.r.t. P and I. Assume A ∈ X. Therefore, by deﬁnition of
unfounded sets, ifA←  ∈ P∗, where = 1∨. . .∨n andi = Li1∧. . .∧Lin , then for
all i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, I (i ) = f or¬.X(i ) = f. Therefore, bymonotonicity of∧ and∨w.r.t.
k , fk (I⊕¬.X)(), i.e.¬.X(A)k P (I⊕¬.X)(A). That relation holds for allA ∈ X
but also for the other atoms (in that case value is ⊥ in X), thus ¬.Xk P (I ⊕¬.X). The
other direction can be shown similarly using the fact that I is a partial classical interpretation,
i.e. a interpretation over {f,⊥, t}. 
Theorem 8. Let P , I and H be a logic program, an interpretation and a hypothesis,
respectively. Consider the iterated sequence of interpretations FI,Hi deﬁned as follows:for any i0,
F
I,H
0 = H,
F
I,H
i+1 = I,HP (F I,Hi ).
The sequenceFI,Hi is monotone decreasing underk and, thus, reaches a ﬁxed-pointFI,H ,
for a limit ordinal . Furthermore, sHP (I ) = FI,H holds.
12 Note that this condition can be rewritten as ¬.X ⊆ P (I ∪ ¬.X).
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Proof. As FI,H1 k F
I,H
0 and 
I,H
P is monotone under k , so the sequence is decreasing
under k , i.e. FI,Hi+1 k F
I,H
i k H . Therefore, the sequence has a ﬁxed-point at the limit,
say FI,H .
Let us show that FI,H is safe and k-greatest. F
I,H
 = I,HP (F I,H ) = H ⊗ P (I ⊕
F
I,H
 ). Therefore, F
I,H
 k H and F
I,H
 k P (I ⊕FI,H ), so FI,H is safe w.r.t.P andH.
Consider any X safe w.r.t. P and H. We show by induction on i thatXkF I,Hi and, thus,
at the limit Xk F I,H , so F
I,H
 is k-greatest.
(i) Case i = 0. By deﬁnition, Xk H = FI,H0 .
(ii) Induction step: suppose Xk F I,Hi . Since X is safe, we have Xk X ⊗ Xk H ⊗
P (I ⊕X). By induction, Xk H ⊗ P (I ⊕ FI,Hi ) = FI,Hi+1 . 
In the following, with FI,Hi we will always indicate the ith iteration of the computation
of the support of P w.r.t. I,H , according to Theorem 8.
Theorem 9. Let P be a logic program. The support operator sHP (I ) is monotone in its
arguments I and H w.r.t. k .
Proof. Consider two interpretations I and J, where I k J , and two hypotheses H and H ′,
where H k H ′. Consider the two sequences FI,Hi and F
J,H ′
i . We show by induction on i
that FI,Hi k F
J,H ′
i and, thus, at the limit s
H
P (I )k sH
′
P (J ).
(i) Case i = 0. By deﬁnition, FI,H0 = H k H ′ = FJ,H0 .
(ii) Induction step: suppose FI,Hi k F J,H
′
i . By monotonicity under k of P and the
induction hypothesis, FI,Hi+1 = H ⊗P (I ⊕FI,Hi )kH ′ ⊗P (J ⊕FJ,H
′
i ) = FJ,H
′
i+1 ,
which concludes. 
Theorem 12. Let P , I and H be a logic program, an interpretation and a hypothesis,
respectively. The following statements are equivalent:
(1) I is a H-founded model of P ,
(2) I = P (I )⊕ sHP (I ),
(3) I  P ⊕ sHP (I ),
(4) I = P (I ⊕ sHP (I )).
Proof. Assume Point 1. holds, i.e. I  P and sHP (I )k I . Then, I = P (I ) = P (I )⊕
sHP (I ), so Point 2 holds. Assume Point 2 holds. Then, by Eq. (2), I = P (I )⊕ sHP (I ) =
P⊕sHP (I )
(I ), i.e. IP⊕sHP (I ), so Point 3 holds. Assume Point 3 holds. So, sHP (I )k I and
from the safeness of sHP (I ), it follows that s
H
P (I )k P (I ⊕ sHP (I )) = P (I ) and, thus,
I = P⊕sHP (I )(I ) = P (I )⊕s
H
P (I ) = P (I ). Therefore,P (I⊕sHP (I )) = P (I ) = I ,
so Point 4 holds. Finally, assume Point 4 holds. From the safeness of sHP (I ), it follows that
sHP (I )kP (I ⊕ sHP (I )) = I . Therefore, I = P (I ⊕ sHP (I )) = P (I ) (i.e. I  P) and,
thus I is a H-founded model of P . So, Point 1 holds, which concludes the proof. 
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Concerning Theorem 14, the operatorHP in Eq. (4), withH = If, has been deﬁned ﬁrst
in [38], without recognizing it to characterize H-founded models. But, it has been shown
in [38] that the least ﬁxed-point under k coincides with the well-founded semantics.
Therefore, from [38] and Theorem 12 it follows immediately that:
Theorem 14. Consider a logic program P . Then thek-least H-founded model of P w.r.t.
the hypothesis H = If is the well-founded semantics of P .
Note that
• by deﬁnition ˜HP (I ) = P (˜
H
P (I ))⊕ ˜
H
P (I ), and thus P (˜
H
P (I ))k ˜
H
P (I ); and
• for ﬁxed-points of ˜HP we have that I = P (I )⊕ I and, thus, P (I )k I .
Before proving Theorem 20, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let P , H, I and K be a logic program, a hypothesis and two interpretations,
respectively. If K  P ⊕ sHP (I ) then ˜
H
P (I )kK .
Proof. Assume K  P ⊕ sHP (I ), i.e. by Eq. (2), K = P⊕sHP (I )(K) = P (K) ⊕ s
H
P (I ).
Therefore, sHP (I )k K . We show by induction on i that J
I,H
i k K and, thus, at the limit
˜
H
P (I )kK .
(i) Case i = 0. By deﬁnition, J I,H0 = sHP (I )k K .
(ii) Induction step: suppose J I,Hi k K . Then by assumption and by induction we have
that J I,Hi+1 = P (J I,Hi ) ⊕ J I,Hi k P (K) ⊕ K = P (K) ⊕ P (K) ⊕ sHP (I ) =
P (K)⊕ sHP (I ) = K , which concludes. 
Theorem 20. Let P , I and H be a logic program, an interpretation and a hypothesis,
respectively. Then ˜HP (I ) = KK(P ⊕ sHP (I )).
Proof. Let K be the Kripke–Kleene model of P ⊕ sHP (I ) under k . K is the limit of the
sequence
K0 = I⊥,
Ki+1 = P⊕sHP (I )(Ki).
AsK  P⊕sHP (I ), by Lemma 1, ˜
H
P (I )k K . Nowwe show thatK k ˜
H
P (I ), by proving
by induction on i that Ki k ˜
H
P (I ) and, thus, at the limit Kk˜
H
P (I ).
(i) Case i = 0. We have K0 = I⊥k ˜HP (I ).
(ii) Induction step: suppose Ki k ˜HP (I ). Then, by induction we have Ki+1 = P⊕sHP (I )
(Ki)kP⊕sHP (I )(˜
H
P (I )). As sHP (I )k ˜
H
P (I ), by Eq. (2) it follows that Ki+1k
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P⊕sHP (I )
(˜
H
P (I )) = P (˜
H
P (I ))⊕sHP (I )k P (˜
H
P (I ))⊕˜
H
P (I ) = ˜
H
P (I ), which
concludes. 
The concluding Theorem 22, follows immediately from the work in [37], where the
hypothesis is “hardwired” to the everywhere false hypothesis H = If.
Theorem 22 (Loyer and Straccia [37]). Let P , I andH = If be a logic program, an inter-
pretation and the everywhere false hypothesis (CWA), respectively. The following statements
are equivalent:
(1) I is a stable model of P ,
(2) I is a H-closed model of P ,
(3) I = ˜HP (I ),
(4) I = KK(P ⊕ sHP (I )).
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